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STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE CHALLENGES IN ARMY TRANSFORMATION
If you don't like change, you're going to like irrelevance even less. The nay sayers and those who say we are going too fast endanger the Army's relevance to national security. It's not a debate. The Army must change because the nation cannot afford to have an Army that is irrelevant.
General Eric Shinseki
BACKGROUND
In the Fall of 1999, the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Shinseki began to communicate his intent to transform the Army to a more deployable, viable force. Shortly thereafter, the Army published a Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP) that outlined the plan for this transformation. The TCP included not only discussion on changing the doctrine and warfighting for the Army but also the institutional Army and supporting structures and policies.'
By January 2000, the initial steps had been taken to identify and transform existing units into an interim design force, one that would bridge the gap between legacy forces and the end state Objective Force. The initial two brigades designated were located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current state of Army transformation, compare critical aspects of the process to the vast body of knowledge available on corporate transformations, and provide recommendations to get transformation back on track. As mentioned, the author witnessed transformation efforts at the tactical and operational levels.
Transformation from that viewpoint appeared on track. Having been exposed to a broader understanding of the change plan, witnessing the level of understanding of the change by a greater cross section of the Army, and studying the roles of strategic leaders in implementing change, the author concludes that the Army is not on track for a successful transformation and is at risk for merely developing a new, medium weight force that is more deployable than heavy forces yet more lethal than light infantry. Transforming the way the Army fights and operates on a daily basis, as communicated in the TCP and in the vision of the CSA, is a difficult and challenging process.
KEY DEFINITIONS
The analysis contained in this paper centers on the roles of strategic leaders, the strategic environment these leaders operate in during their efforts to transform organizations, and the impacts of the culture and subcultures of the organization. The definition of strategic leadership used by the Army War College is "the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus..."2
The strategic leadership environment can be defined as "internal and external complexities that directly and indirectly affect resourcing, structuring, and operational performance of the organization." 3 This includes coalitions, attitudes, impacts of technological advances, budgets, and changing threats and missions. Finally, strategic culture can be defined as "a set of institutional, stated, and operating values, beliefs, and assumptions that people have about their
organization that are validated by experiences over time. In the case of large organizations, a myriad of powerful subcultures exist that warrant consideration during a transformation process.
An example of an Army subculture would be heavy and light forces, Department of the Army civilians, and the Army Reserve.
These definitions provide a framework for examining the complexity of an organization, the crucial role of strategic leaders, and the difficulty in transforming the way an organization operates and views itself. All of these aspects require detailed review and consideration both prior to and during the transformation effort. The initial decision to transform, however, solely rests on the shoulders and communicated vision of the organizational leader. The Army lacks a force that can respond within a short timeline and yield legitimate lethality.
STRATEGIC VISION
Major General Dubik, the initial officer charged with overseeing transformation, saw the Objective Force as being "flexible enough to accomplish any mission". In concurrence with Murphy's (2000) and Miles' (1997) concepts of change, the Army TCP describes a change process that occurs simultaneously through every aspect of the Army.
From installation renovations to leader training to manning the force to rewriting doctrine, the plan emphasizes synchronization of the change on every venue." To promote this change process, the CSA has communicated his vision at several points in past months. 
LEADER'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND RESISTANCE
The apparent leadership tactic that the CSA has adopted for implementing his change appears to focus on dollars affecting the IAV production line, and the creation of the six IBCTs.
Although his method is unconfirmed, one can assume this technique will result in confrontation with those aspects of the organizational culture, to include key leadership, that disagree with his vision. The CSA has used the term irreversible momentum as a point in transformation where it is no longer viable to move from the Objective Force design back to legacy type forces.1 7 In other words, after six IBCTs have been fully fielded and the production lines are geared toward fielding the remaining brigades, it will be too late to reverse the process based on sheer dollars and amount of Objective Force equipment added to the Army's inventory.
4 Kotter (1996) describes the selection of a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition as a critical step to successful transformation.1 8 The TCP specifies that the Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) is responsible as the change agent. In addition, the TRADOC leadership is further delineated by appointing a Deputy Commander for Transformation, assigned at Fort Lewis, Washington as the director of transformation efforts. This appointment forms two chains of command that either have a direct command relationship with the unit (I Corps from Forces Command) or a supervisory/support relationship (TRADOC). Although the concern for successful transformation is shared by each command, the final say on training and activities within the IBCTs falls to the legal chain of command, FORSCOM. As Kotter explains, a guiding coalition that is not recognized as part of the line leadership is seldom successful in overcoming sources of conflict and inertia.' 9 The current situation at Fort Lewis with the IBCTs is that transformation decisions rest with I Corps, not the TRADOC agent assigned responsibility in the TCP by the CSA. In addition to the dangers of a weak guiding coalition, several authors discuss time as a barrier to transformation. As Jablonsky observes, the challenge is not so much the change to a new way of fighting with advanced technology, it is overcoming mindsets and institutional Changing an organization's culture to support and foster change toward a new vision is clearly the task of strategic leadership in an organization. Changing culture is a difficult task and management theories fall into two schools of thought on when and how to change organizational cultures. According to Tony Eccles in Succeeding with Change, the culture must be changed up front, prior to transformation. 22 Others, like John Kotter, feel that if organizational priorities and resourcing changes happen first, the cultural change will follow. 23 Advocates of a culture change first mentality would argue that values and policies need to 24 change first, gaining buy in and acceptance by key leaders in the organization.
If the change of culture is not addressed first, the result is that the old culture overrides the organization change effort to a point where the embedded assumptions that drive the organization will cause subordinates. The attacks of September 11th have directly impacted on several of these areas in question. The Department of Defense has received additional funding, some earmarked as transformation dollars. As transformation continues, with some barriers overcome and new ones imposed, the complexity of ensuring the Army's leadership at all levels understands the plan and vision becomes more difficult. Strategic leaders must have a mechanism to monitor dissemination of information.
THE CHANGE PLAN IN REVIEW
The TCP states "the level of detail required to synchronize Army wide transformation efforts and maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of those efforts" is contained in the plan. 27 The plan describes how the Army will transition not only forces and doctrine but the institutional Army. In theory, this concept would agree with the theories already discussed, a change effort conducted simultaneously along all fronts. Efforts in the 1980's to create a new, highly mobile motorized force failed to address these institutional changes. A final anecdote that reflects the non-support to the IBCTs as a priority in transformation centers on infrastructure and manning. As an installation, Fort Lewis was not prepared to transition support for two IBCTs. From barracks to motor pool capabilities, the installation was forced to revise the brigade areas which resulted in breaking teams and displacing soldiers.
Undermanned military occupational skills (MOSs) were taken from existing Corps units as bill payers. 32 In addition, the IBCT doctrine involves taking the majority of the maintenance personnel out of the organization, to include sections that conduct vehicle services. By the new doctrine, these services are contracted. No one had thought through this requirement and Director of Logistics took on this mission, being forced to hire contract help and submit a notable unfinanced requirement to pay the workers. The result was a back log of hundreds of vehicles over due services and unavailable for training.
In a detailed study of these initial transformation efforts, faculty members of the Army War College noted that without an entire system of systems change, the costs and resistance were incredibly high. The effect on transition was not only delay and loss of momentum, but bitterness and resistance to the entire transformation effort. 33 Just as enemy actions are considered when devising plans, obstacles that may block, delay, or derail change efforts must be wargammed and counter-actions planned. These strategies, just like contingency plans, will assist the leader in ensuring the plan keeps on track.
Training and Educating
Army doctrine on changing force structure and integrating new forces is contained in FM 100-11 Force Integration. In this manual it states "commanders and leaders must be educated to understand the nature of organizational change to execute planned and programmed force integration actions." 3 7 Most officers are likely to never read this manual unless they are assigned to a staff position dealing with force integration. The military education system of the typical officer includes little if any training on the force development/force integration process. In addition, organizational change, change leadership, and transformation are topics not covered until 19-22 years into an officer's career, and then only during attendance (if selected) at the Senior Service Colleges. In addition to training officers, the force integration process is designed to train entry level personnel on new doctrine, policies, and equipment in order to fill units with proficient personnel. 38 Aside from the new equipment training being conducted by soldiers in the IBCTs, there apparently are no specialized schooling programs that assist to fill this shortcoming.
Communicating the Change -Proactively Avoiding Obstacles
The Army Transformation Case Study, used in classes at the Army War College, accurately describes the flow of information in the Army regarding transformation. "Army leaders at all levels are faced with supporting an undefined concept that depends upon a yet-to-be-developed technology with an unknown impact on most of the Army's organizations.
Establishing support on faith and loyalty alone does not provide the lasting impetus for change...". 39 A possible barrier to the new warfighting concepts of the Objective Force design is a lack of disseminating information throughout the Army prior to embarking on the transformation journey. The majority of the Army realized the need for a medium weight brigade yet failed to comprehend the rationale for transitioning the entire force. Now, as the transition of brigades occurs to an IBCT configuration and lessons are added to lesson plans in school houses, the Army is slowly trying to understand what transformation means to them.
Reducing Barriers Through Proving Success of the New Design
The final and perhaps most important way to reduce resistance is to prove that the new concept works. The IBCTs have several evaluations or decision points they must negotiate until they are deemed fully capable. These include field training exercises, deployments, warfighter exercises, and joint operations. However, the selection of units to transition appears to detract from any effort to highlight success of the concept. Budget increases since the terrorist attacks support Army transformation. According to key leaders in the transitioning brigades, real world requirements such as supporting external training requirements and limited budgets still impact on transitioning.44 Finally, the development and procurement of new technologies that support the Objective Force remains an unknown. If former research and development efforts are any indication, fielding, testing, and validation of this equipment will continue to cause transformation to slip to the out years.
Using line item cuts of systems related to legacy force equipment, the Chief of Staff has energized new opposition to transformation. Those Congressmen with production lines of legacy equipment and/or short term developments are building a strong alliance of opposition to these cuts. 45 In addition, the mounting perspective that the Marine Corps and not the Army provides a viable, rapidly deployable force creates more concern for transformation efforts and dollars. 46 Listed below are recommendations based on sound organizational change models that will help enhance the Army's transformation effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS -GETTING TRANSFORMATION BACK ON TRACK
Communicating the Vision...Again
The CSA should conduct in progress reviews with commanders down to and including all brigade level commanders. These periodic feedback sessions should serve as updates on what the CSA expects from the force and feedback to the CSA from the field on how the transformation is progressing. A detailed briefing of the TCP should be conducted by the CSA's deputy for operations for every battalion and brigade commander select at the Pre-Command
Course. In addition, school house curriculums should add entire blocks of instruction and study, not just individual lessons, on Army Transformation. Personnel rotating from IBCTs and transformation cells to schoolhouses should be used to augment faculty in an effort to explain these new concepts. Additionally, the CSA should conduct periodic updates beyond the appointed action groups. Transformation, as mentioned, is a systems change. Therefore, every General Officer in the Total Army owns some piece of the process. The CSA should require all General Officers, in a collective gathering that benefits the entire group, to periodically back brief him on the transformation efforts in their units/sections. These meetings should include objective standards, measures of effectiveness, and any adjustments to timelines. Finally, the CSA should take a-visible role in embedding the proper terminology of the transformation effort. Many have heard him say that transformation, and the IBCTs, are not an experiment. He, and the Army, has made the decision to transition, and the IBCTs are a short term fix for a deployable medium weight brigade. This is not an experiment that can succeed or fail, it is the future. However, even at a four star level, the language continues to be inconsistent with the CSA's intent. As an example, in the Army Green Book, one four star commander states that the IBCTs are an experiment." 7 Although the CSA may deal with these incidents privately, publicly these key leaders need to speak the same language as the CSA. If those in command of the Army's largest organizations fail to understand the efforts of the CSA or fail-to support him, how will other soldiers and civilians every work toward a common endstate?
Create an Interim Division
One of the positive lessons learned from the 9th Infantry Division's experiment in designing a motorized force was that the Division Commander had direct control on the transformation effort. In addition, he answered directly to the CSA. 4 8 The current plan of transitioning individual brigades from different parent organizations does not work. With a division designated to act as an Interim Division (IDIV) design, the commander would have the resources, control, and visibility to make the transformation more effective and expedient.
Instead of a TRADOC Cell overseeing the transformation effort, TRADOC doctrine writers and force designers should work directly for the new IDIV Commander on his staff. This system would allow for timely and accurate feedback to the school houses that are proponents for branch equipment and doctrine. A detailed study of training areas, to include live fire and urban training facilities, deployability platforms, maintenance facilities, environmental impacts, digital infrastructure, and logistics support, both military and contracted, need to be considered before selecting a location for the Interim Division.
Hire a Consultant Group
As mentioned early, standard military schooling does not prepare officers for the complexities of managing organizational change. Although some specialized schooling opportunities exist, such as the Force Development Course and Organizational Change Course, not enough officers or non-commissioned officers involved with the management of the transformation process attend. Even for those that do attend, gaining an expert understanding in organizational change and organizational culture is difficult based on the complexity of this field. The business world has proven experts in this complicated field. The Army should hire, for the remainder of the transition period, a group of proven consultants who monitor, advise, and evaluate the change efforts. Hiring of retired officers or giving the mission to one of the habitual contract organizations used by the Army is ill advised, based on all the barriers to change discussed previously in this essay. The head of this consultant group should have direct access to the CSA and participate in his periodic in process reviews. Select personnel being assigned to IBCTs and staffs responsible for executing the Army's TCP should attend what few courses are offered by the Army and supporting agencies prior to their assignments. These schools at a minimum will enhance their awareness as to the complexities of organizational change. Finally, several authors on organizational change mention workshops that they conduct for organizations. Regardless of the cost, these type workshops seem to be a cost effective way to assist in the Army's transformation efforts. Allowing these soldiers to transition to new assignments prior to this critical gate in Army transformation is similar to the disastrous personnel rotation policies used during the Vietnam War. Should the initial evaluation of the IBCT result in unsatisfactory performance, the Army's transformation timeline faces great setbacks. Blaming a mediocre result on personnel turnover and turbulence is an outcome the Army can proactively avoid. After a successful test, the officers and non-commissioned officers of the IBCT can be assigned to school houses, doctrine writer assignments, and positions of responsibility in newly forming brigades. Every soldier at some point assigned to and trained in these unique brigades should be also managed by skill identifiers that allow them to be tracked in specialty areas related to the Objective Force design.
As a short term fix, the Army should screen personnel records of every soldier to ascertain the experience they already have in digital or futuristic system capabilities, such as the soldiers in the digital force at Fort Hood and the soldiers that have participated in Advance Warfighter
Experiments. Tracking these soldiers and building their expertise through assignments in the IBCTs seems to be an effective way to expedite change.
Information Campaign and Coalition Building
The CSA and those directly responsible for the implementation of the Army's TCP need to readdress the process of educating and informing the Army and supporting organizations as Unfortunately, the Marine Corps stood ready with a force similar to the Army's Interim Force.
The Army is late in developing a legitimate force. Gaining irreversible momentum for change through forcing a quicker production schedule for the IAV and doing line item cuts to existing projects is one technique for instilling change. But will this technique result in further delays and opposition from Capital Hill?
In the end, General Shinseki may depart his position in May of 2003 without the Interim Force proving itself on battlefields or at Combat Training Centers. As projects and fielding delays continue, the production line will shift into the future. Perhaps the greatest lesson in the Army's transformation effort will be identifying the lack of education of its officers and mid level managers with respect to how to change and transform organizations. Sheer will of mind and giving directives through the chain of command have proved thus far to be ineffective. 
